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Abstract
The NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) is a tool for the formal speciﬁcation and analysis of cryptographic
protocols that has been used with great eﬀect on a number of complex real-life protocols. One of the most
interesting of its features is that it can be used to reason about security in face of attempted attacks on
low-level algebraic properties of the functions used in a protocol. Recently, we have given for the ﬁrst time a
precise formal speciﬁcation of the main features of the NPA inference system: its grammar-based techniques
for (co-)invariant generation and its backwards narrowing reachability analysis method; both implemented
in Maude as the Maude-NPA tool. This formal speciﬁcation is given within the well-known rewriting
framework so that the inference system is speciﬁed as a set of rewrite rules modulo an equational theory
describing the behavior of the cryptographic symbols involved. This paper gives a high-level overview of the
Maude-NPA tool and illustrates how it supports equational reasoning about properties of the underlying
cryptographic infrastructure by means of a simple, yet nontrivial, example of an attack whose discovery
essentially requires equational reasoning. It also shows how rule-based programming languages such as
Maude and complex narrowing strategies are useful to model, analyze, and verify protocols.
Keywords: Cryptographic Protocol Veriﬁcation, Equational Reasoning, Narrowing, Rewriting Logic,
Maude
1 Introduction
The NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) [16] is a tool for the formal speciﬁcation and
analysis of cryptographic protocols that has been used with great eﬀect on a num-
ber of complex real-life protocols. One of the most interesting of its features is that
it can be used not only to prove or disprove authentication and secrecy properties
using the standard Dolev-Yao model [9], but also to reason about security in face of
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attempted attacks on low-level algebraic properties of the functions used in a proto-
col. Indeed, it has been used successfully to either reproduce or discover a number
of such attacks, ranging from the discovery of an authentication attack based on
the cancellation properties of encryption and decryption [15], to the reproduction
of Bellovin’s attack on a version of the Encapsulating Security Protocol that used
cipher block chaining, and to the discovery of a sophisticated type confusion attack
[20,17] that resulted in the redesign of a draft for a protocol standard.
NPA’s ability to reason well about these low-level functionalities is its combina-
tion of symbolic reachability analysis using narrowing, together with its grammar-
based techniques for reducing the size of the search space. On one hand, uniﬁcation
modulo algebraic properties (e.g., encryption and decryption, concatenation and
deconcatenation) as narrowing using a ﬁnite convergent (i.e., conﬂuent and ter-
minating) set of rewrite rules where the right-hand side of each rule is either a
subterm of the left-hand side or a ground term [8] allows the tool to represent be-
havior which is not captured by the usual Dolev-Yao free algebra model. On the
other hand, techniques for reducing the size of the search space by using inductively
deﬁned co-invariants describing states unreachable to an intruder allows us to start
with an inﬁnite search space and reduce it in many cases to a ﬁnite one, thus freeing
us from the requirement to put any a priori limits on the number of sessions.
Recently, we have given for the ﬁrst time [10] a precise formal speciﬁcation of
the main features of the NPA inference system: its backwards reachability analysis
method and its grammar-based techniques for co-invariant generation. This for-
mal speciﬁcation is given within the well-known rewriting framework so that the
inference system is speciﬁed as a set of rewrite rules modulo an equational theory
describing the behavior of the cryptographic symbols involved. The inference sys-
tem has been implemented in Maude, which we called the Maude-NRL Protocol
Analyzer (Maude-NPA) tool. We have used the rewriting framework to prove some
important meta-logical properties, such as the soundness and completeness of its
search algorithm, i.e., the tool will discover an attack of the type speciﬁed by the
user if and only if such an attack exists at the level of abstraction supported by
the model, and the unreachability of the states characterized by grammars, i.e., the
drastic state space reductions aﬀorded by such grammars do not compromise the
completeness of the search algorithm.
But [10] provides also a modular basis that can be viewed as a ﬁrst step towards
reaching a longer-term goal, i.e., extending the Maude-NPA’s inference system to
support the analysis of cryptographic protocols under a wider range of algebraic
properties than it currently is capable of, with the ultimate plan of building a
next-generation rewriting-based analysis tool that takes into account the algebraic
properties of the underlying cryptographic functions. In Section 3 we illustrate the
ease with which new equational properties of the cryptographic infrastructure can
be modularly added to the Maude-NPA by demonstrating how these techniques can
be applied to the analysis of type confusion attacks.
Type confusion attacks, ﬁrst discussed in detail in [12], are attacks which exploit
ambiguity in formatting to allow an attacker to convince a principal that data
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of one type (e.g., a name) is data of another type (e.g., a nonce). Because of
the level of protocol model detailing that is required, realistic examples of type
confusion attacks in the literature of formal analysis of cryptographic protocols
are rare. Moreover, most existing protocol tools do not allow for the possibility, for
example, of concatenations of terms being confused with a single term, or of pieces of
terms with a whole term. However, in [17] the authors describe an example of using
the NRL Protocol Analyzer to ﬁnd an attack of this sort. The attack is on an early
version of the Group Domain of Interpretation Protocol [4], which has two parts,
each of which makes use of digitally signed messages in a diﬀerent way. In the early
version, the digitally signed messages began and ended with nonces, which made it
possible for an attacker to pass oﬀ a string of data of diﬀerent types as a nonce in
a way that such string of data can be interpreted later as another type of signed
message. However, the NRL Protocol Analyzer’s inability to model associativity
of concatenation meant that it was only able to ﬁnd one of the attacks; the other
had to be found by hand. In the following example, we consider a simpler protocol
which is subject to a similar type confusion, and show how it can be handled by
adding a limited version of associativity to the Maude-NPA speciﬁcation.
Example 1.1 This protocol uses digital signatures to achieve authentication be-
tween two parties, Alice and Bob. The protocol involves an initiator, Alice, a
responder, Bob, and a server S providing nonces. We use the common notation
A ↪→ B : M to stand for “A sends message M to B”. Encryption of message M
using the public key of principal X is denoted by {M}X , where we assume that
public keys are known by all the principals, including the intruder. Encryption
using the private key is denoted by {M}X−1 , where we assume that a private key is
known only by its owner. Decryption is done by combination of public and private
keys, i.e., {M}X can be decrypted only by principal X, who knows the private key
X−1, and {M}X−1 can be decrypted by every principal. Nonces are represented by
NX , denoting a nonce created by principal X. The protocol description proceeds
as follows.
(i) S ↪→ A : NS
The server S sends a nonce to A.
(ii) A ↪→ B : {NS , S}A−1
A sends the nonce provided by the server and the server’s name to B, signed
with its private key.
(iii) A ↪→ B : {B,NA, S}A−1
Then, A sends B name, a new nonce, and the server’s name to B, signed again
with its private key.
In a rule-based representation of this protocol, parts unknown for a principal are
represented by a variable. That is, since nonces are known only to the princi-
pal who generated it, we say that Alice receives message X and generates mes-
sages {X,S}A−1 and {B,NA, S}A−1 , and Bob receives messages {X
′, S}A−1 and
{B,X ′′, S}A−1 .
If we ask whether a principal acting as Bob can get confused and understand
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the message {B,X ′′, S}A−1 , expected as its second message, as if it was its ﬁrst
expected message {X ′, S}A−1 , then we can intuitively answer no, but we will be
assuming some type checking over the messages. In an actual implementation of
the protocol type-checking would be implemented by format checking. If the for-
mat is deﬁned ambiguously, then type-checking will not be implemented properly
and types may be confused. For example, this is what happened in the analysis
of the GDOI protocol. For the purpose of our simple type confusion analysis we
will assume that, although names have a recognized format, and hence a recognized
type, nonces do not. Thus, for example, a name followed by a nonce can be con-
fused with a nonce. Therefore, in this paper, we do not perform type checking on
the variable X ′ of the ﬁrst expected message {X ′, S}A−1 . In this situation, when
associativity of the pairing (or concatenation) operator , is taken into account,
there is a possible confusion 5 between the generated message {B,NA, S}A−1 and
the expected message {X ′, S}A−1 , i.e., message {B,NA, S}A−1 can be understood
as {B, (NA, S)}A−1 or {(B,NA), S}A−1 depending on who receives it.
In this example, associativity is a cryptographic property of the protocol that has
to be considered in order to ﬁnd the ﬂaw in the protocol. However, it is well-known
that general associative uniﬁcation problems can yield an inﬁnite number of uniﬁers
[2] and, therefore, our approach is to provide an approximation of associativity
for up to 3 elements. On the other hand, note that this confusion appears only
when two sessions of the protocol are executed at the same time, i.e., the message
{B,NA, S}A−1 is generated in one session, and the message {X
′, S}A−1 is expected
in the other session. This is relevant when compared to other approaches that
impose several restrictions, as in the case of a bounded number of sessions, or that
perform approximations of the protocol, as in the case of a ﬁnite number of messages
or fresh nonces. The ProVerif tool [5] allows an unbounded number of sessions but
abstractions are performed on fresh data and thus false attacks can be obtained.
The OFMC tool in the AVISPA tool [1] follows a similar approach to ours, since they
consider “depth parameters” for uniﬁcation problems in some equational theories
[3]. However, they consider only a bounded number of sessions. The Scyther tool [7]
allows an unbounded number of sessions and does not apply abstractions on fresh
data, but no cryptographic symbols are considered.
2 The Maude-NPA
In the Maude-NPA, protocols are speciﬁed with a notation quite close to that of
strand spaces [11]. In a strand, a local execution of a protocol by a principal is
indicated by a sequence of messages [msg−1 ,msg
+
2 ,msg
−
3 , . . . ,msg
−
k−1,msg
+
k ] where
nodes representing input messages are assigned a negative sign, and nodes repre-
senting output messages are assigned a positive sign. Strands evolve in time and
5 Technically speaking, this confusion is only possible under the assumption that the variable X′ in the
expected message {X′, S}A−1 is a variable of a generic sort message instead of a variable of a sort nonce
and such that the generic sort message can contain a message of variable length, i.e., variables X′ can be a
sequence {t1, . . . , tk} of messages where 1 ≤ k ≤ 3.
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thus we use the symbol | to divide past and future in a strand, i.e.,
[msg±1 , . . . ,msg
±
j−1 | msg
±
j ,msg
±
j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k ]
where msg±1 , . . . ,msg
±
j−1 are the past messages, and msg
±
j ,msg
±
j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k are
the future messages (msg±j is the immediate future message).
A state is a set of strands together with the intruder knowledge at that point.
The intruder knowledge is represented using two kinds of facts: a positive knowledge
fact is denoted by m∈I and a negative knowledge fact is denoted by m/∈I, where
m is a message expression. The following example illustrates the notion of a state,
where we have two strands at diﬀerent time positions and the intruder does know
the message {N,S}A−1 but does not know yet the message {B,NA, S}A−1 (note
that N is a variable whose concrete variable is still unknown):
[ N−, ({N,S}A−1)
+ | ({B,NA, S}A−1)
+ ] &
[ nil | ({M,S}A−1)
−, ({B,NA, S}A−1)
− ] &
{ ({N,S}A−1)∈I, ({B,NA, S}A−1)/∈I, K }
Strands communicate between them via the intruder, i.e., by sending a message
m to the intruder who will send it back to another strand. When the intruder
receives a message, then it learns it, i.e., a message m is learned in a transition
from a state with the fact m/∈I in its intruder knowledge part to a state with the
fact m∈I in its intruder knowledge part (in a forward execution of the protocol).
The intruder has the usual ability to read and redirect traﬃc, and can also perform
operations, e.g., encryption, decryption, concatenation, etc., on messages that it
has received. Intruder operations are described in terms of the intruder sending
messages to itself, which are represented as diﬀerent strands, one for each action.
All intruder and protocol strands are described symbolically, using a mixture of
variables and constants, so a single speciﬁcation can stand for multiple instances.
There is no restriction in the number of principals, number of sessions, nonces, or
time, i.e., no data abstraction or approximation is performed. It is also possible to
include algebraic properties of the operators (cryptographic and otherwise) as an
equational theory.
The Maude-NPA’s reachability analysis is based on two parameters: a protocol
P represented by strands, and a grammar sequence G = 〈G1, . . . , Gm〉 used to cut
down the search space. Analysis is done in Maude-NPA via backwards narrowing
search from an (insecure) goal state SSbad. States are (E-)uniﬁed with (reversed)
rewrite rules describing state transitions via narrowing modulo an equational theory
E. Grammars 〈G1, . . . , Gm〉 represent negative information (or co-invariants), i.e.,
inﬁnite sets of states unreachable for the intruder. These grammars are very im-
portant in our framework, since in the best case they can reduce the inﬁnite search
space to a ﬁnite one, or, at least, can drastically reduce the search space. The
tool tries to deduce whether the protocol is safe for SSbad or not. If the protocol
is unsafe, Maude-NPA always terminates with an intruder learning sequence and
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the exchange message sequence, provided enough time and memory resources. In
this case, grammars can actually improve the time and memory consumption by
reducing the number of states to analyze. If the protocol is safe, the algorithm
can often prove it, provided the search space is ﬁnite. In this case, grammars are
the key and provide a drastic reduction on the search space such that an inﬁnite
search space is reduced to a ﬁnite one. If the protocol is safe but the search space
is inﬁnite, Maude-NPA runs forever. This provides a semi-decision algorithm. See
[10] for further explanations.
The protocol to be analyzed is provided to the tool as a signature Σ includ-
ing symbols, sorts, and subsort information (see [19,6]), together with the set
P of strands deﬁning the protocol. Moreover, the tool expects some seed terms
〈sd1, . . . , sdn〉 for the generation of the grammars 〈G1, . . . , Gm〉 where m ≤ n. Al-
though the user is required to supply the seed terms for the grammars, we are
studying how to automatically generate them. These seed terms 〈sd1, . . . , sdn〉 rep-
resent knowledge that the user believes is not known by the intruder and from which
the tool generates the formal languages 〈G1, . . . , Gm〉 representing several inﬁnite
sets of states unreachable for the intruder. In the speciﬁcation of the protocol-
speciﬁc signature Σ, there is a special sort Msg for messages. The user will add
extra symbols involving the sort Msg. Special algebraic properties of a protocol
may be speciﬁed with symbols in Σ and a set E of equations such that the sort of
the terms of the equations must be Msg or smaller. In security analyses it is often
necessary to use fresh unguessable values, e.g., for nonces. The user can make use
of a special sort Fresh in the protocol-speciﬁc signature Σ for representing them.
The meaning of a variable of sort Fresh is that it will never be instantiated by an
E-uniﬁer generated during the backwards reachability analysis. This ensures that
if nonces are represented using variables of sort Fresh, they will never be merged
and no approximation for nonces is necessary. However, the framework is very ﬂex-
ible, and the user can specify some constant symbols of sort Fresh to play with
nonces that can indeed be merged, i.e., approximated. Since variables of sort Fresh
are treated in a special way, we make them explicit in the strand deﬁnition of the
example by writing
(r1, . . . , rk : Fresh) [msg
±
1 , . . . ,msg
±
n ],
where r1, . . . , rk are all the variables of sort Fresh appearing in msg
±
1 , . . . ,msg
±
n .
We impose a requirement on the protocols that can be speciﬁed in our tool w.r.t.
the algebraic properties speciﬁed with a set E of equations. Intuitively, a principal
can send whatever he/she likes but the pieces of information being processed by the
intruder or by a principal are always simpliﬁed w.r.t. the oriented version of E. We
say a term t is →→
E
-irreducible if it is a normal form w.r.t. the oriented version
→
E
of E, i.e., no rule in
→
E can be applied to t. We say that a term t is strongly →→
E
-
irreducible if for any substitution σ and variable x such that σ(x) is →→
E
-irreducible,
then σ(t) is →→
E
-irreducible. Then, the requirement that we impose on the protocols
is that all messages appearing in the reachability and grammar generation stages
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have to be strongly →→
E
-irreducible, except output messages in a strand (i.e., m+)
and positive knowledge facts (i.e., m∈I).
Another important aspect of our framework is that everything the intruder can
learn must be learned through strands, i.e., the intruder knows nothing in an initial
state. However, this is not a limitation, since we can write strands [ M+ ] for any
message M the intruder is able to know at an initial state.
3 Finding Attacks by Equational Reasoning
3.1 Protocol Speciﬁcation
Continuing Example 1.1, we can denote nonce NX by n(X, r), where r is a variable
of sort Fresh. Concatenation of two messages is denoted by the operator ; , e.g.,
n(A, r);n(B, r′). Encryption of a message M with the public key of principal A is
denoted by pk(A,M), e.g., {NS , S}A is denoted by pk(A,n(S, r);S). Encryption of
a message with a private key is denoted by sk(A,M), e.g., {NS , S}A−1 is denoted
by sk(A,n(S, r);S). The names of all the principals are ﬁxed, since they are just
roles, where the intruder is denoted by constant i. The only secret key operation the
intruder can perform is sk(i,m) for a known message m. The order-sorted signature
Σ deﬁning the protocol is the following:
a : → Name b : → Name s : → Name i : → Name
pk : Name×Msg → Enc sk : Name×Msg → Enc n : Name× Fresh → Nonce
; : Msg× Elem → Msg ; : Msg×Msg → Msg
together with the following subsort relations
Name Nonce Enc < Elem Elem < Msg
The encryption/decryption cancellation properties are described using the following
equations in E:
pk(K, sk(K,M)) = M sk(K, pk(K,M)) = M
where K is a variable of sort Name and M is a variable of sort Msg. We now discuss
the algebraic properties of the concatenation operator. The obvious requirement is
to make ; associative. However, it is well-known that general associative uniﬁca-
tion problems can yield an inﬁnite number of uniﬁers [2]. This could cause inﬁnite
branching in our narrowing algorithm and preclude termination of the Maude-NPA.
Our approach is to provide a sound approximation of associativity by a weaker sub-
theory of it having a ﬁnitary uniﬁcation algorithm. We achieve this by exploiting the
order-sorted structure of our speciﬁcation and using well-known narrowing results.
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The weaker instance of associativity that we add to E is the equation 6
X; (Y ;Z) = (X;Y );Z
where the variables X,Y,Z are of sort Elem. Note that the rules obtained by
orienting this and the previous equations in E from left to right provide a conﬂu-
ent, terminating, and sort-decreasing term rewriting system. It is then well-known
that basic narrowing [13] provides a sound and complete E-uniﬁcation algorithm,
which is ﬁnitary if the right-hand side of each equation in E is either a constructor
term 7 , a subterm of the left-hand side, or a ground term [8]. Note that the en-
cryption/decryption equations satisfy this requirement. Our associativity equation
also does, because when the variables X,Y,Z are of sort Elem the term (X;Y );Z
is a constructor term, since the overloaded typing ; : Msg × Elem → Msg is a
constructor operator in the sense explained in Footnote 7. Therefore, narrowing
provides a ﬁnitary E-uniﬁcation algorithm for our theory E.
Our associativity equation is of course a very restrictive subtheory of the full
theory of associativity, but it has the important advantage of yielding, together
with the encryption/decryption equations, a ﬁnitary E-uniﬁcation algorithm by
basic narrowing. Using order-sorted techniques, we can similarly deﬁne increasingly
more expressive bounded associativity theories, having associativity laws for strings
of up to n elements for any n ≥ 3. The advantage of such theories is that, by
arguments similar to the one given here for n = 3, their uniﬁcation algorithms by
narrowing are all ﬁnitary; see Footnote 6.
In the following, variables M , M ′, M1, M2, M
′
1, M
′
2 are of sort Msg, variables
X,Y,Z are of sort Elm, variable N is of sort Nonce, variables r, r′, r′′, r′′′ are of sort
Fresh, and variable A is of sort Name. Note that the strongly →→
E
-irreducibility
requirement implies that no input message of the form pk(A,M)−, sk(A,M)− or
(W ;M)− can appear in a strand of the protocol, where A is a variable of sort Name,
W is a variable of sort S s.t. S ≤ Msg, and M is a variable of sort Msg. For instance,
M in pk(A,M)− could be instantiated to sk(A,M ′) and then pk(A, sk(A,M ′))− is
not →→
E
-irreducible. The strands P associated to the three protocol steps shown in
Example 1.1 are as follows, one for each principal (or role) in the protocol:
(s1) (r : Fresh) [n(s, r)+]
This strand denotes the server s sending a nonce to a principal.
(s2) (r′ : Fresh) [N−, sk(a,N ; s)+, sk(a, b; (n(a, r′); s))+]
This strand denotes principal a receiving a nonce from a principal and then
6 Note that the reverse equation (X; Y );Z = X; (Y ;Z) is not useful as a rule for this example, since it is the
term sk(a, b; (n(a, r); s)) that has to be converted into sk(a, (b;n(a, r)); s). Moreover, such reverse equation
will make the E-uniﬁcation procedure intractable (i.e., inﬁnitary), since we could apply, by narrowing, the
rule X; (Y ;Z) → (X; Y );Z and then the rule (X; Y );Z → X; (Y ;Z) inﬁnitely many times.
7 A constructor term is a term built up with only constructor symbols and variables. Given a set of rewrite
rules l1→r1, . . . , ln→rn over a many-sorted signature Σ, a function symbol f : s1 × . . . × sn −→ s in Σ
is called a constructor if it does not appear as the root symbol of any left-hand side l1, . . . , ln. In an
order-sorted context this notion is somewhat more subtle, since the symbol f can be overloaded and can
be a constructor (in the sense that no rules apply to it) for some typings and a deﬁned symbol for other
typings. That is, the symbol f can indeed appear in a lefthand side li, but it should never be possible to
type that lefthand side, or any of its well-sorted substitution instances θ(li), with any of the constructor
versions of f . We illustrate this subtle point with our associativity axiom.
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sending two messages encrypted with his private key, one with the received
nonce and the server’s name s, and another with names b and s, and a new
generated nonce.
(s3) [sk(a,M ; s)−, sk(a, (b;N); s)−]
This strand denotes principal b receiving two messages, where he/she looks
for name s in the ﬁrst and names b and s in the second.
The following strands describe the intruder ability to concatenate, deconcatenate,
encrypt and decrypt messages according 8 to the Dolev-Yao attacker’s capabilities
[9]:
(s4) [M−1 ,M
−
2 , (M1;M2)
+] Concatenation
(s5) [(M1;M2)
−,M+1 ,M
+
2 ] Deconcatenation
(s6) [M−, pk(A,M)+] Encryption with public key
(s7) [M−, sk(i,M)+] Encryption with private key
As explained above, grammars representing several inﬁnite sets of states un-
reachable for the intruder are very important in our framework, since they represent
negative information (co-invariants) that will be used to cut down the search space.
In this case (and many others) the grammars reduce the inﬁnite search space to a
ﬁnite one. For instance, by capturing the following inﬁnite backwards narrowing
sequence 9 :
m (M1;m) (M
′
1;M1;m) · · ·
generated by the Dolev-Yao strand for deconcatenation shown above. We describe
the grammar generation below. A more detailed description is given in [10].
3.2 Grammar Generation
The Maude-NPA starts out with the seed terms, which represent knowledge that
the user believes is not known by the intruder. There are only two types of seed
terms: (i) ∅ 	→ t∈L, denoting that the term t of sort Msg is unknown for the intruder
without any restriction, and (ii) t|p /∈I 	→ t∈L, denoting that the term t of sort Msg
is unknown for the intruder provided that the subterm t|p is certainly unknown by
the intruder, i.e., provided that the fact t|p /∈I appears in the intruder’s knowledge
of the state of the protocol that we will be processing at each moment. The concrete
seed terms for Example 1.1 are as follows:
sd1 ≡ M1 /∈I 	→ (M1;M2)∈L sd2 ≡ M2 /∈I 	→ (M1;M2)∈L
sd3 ≡ M /∈I 	→ sk(A,M)∈L sd4 ≡ M /∈I 	→ pk(A,M)∈L
They are understood as initial grammars, e.g., the language production
M /∈I 	→ pk(A,M)∈L denotes a formal language including any message
8 Note that we have simpliﬁed the intruder rules w.r.t. [9]; see [10, Example 3] for further details.
9 For the ease of reading, we deliberately omit the rewrite theory RP = (ΣP , RP , EP ) for strands used in
each narrowing step RP ,EP during the reachability stage; see [10] for further details. We also omit the
extra strand information and just write the relevant messages to be learned by the intruder, i.e., all the
messages appearing in strands as input messages m−.
S. Escobar et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 23–36 31
pk(t1, t2) such that subterm t1 is of sort Name and the intruder does not know
yet the subterm t2 of sort Msg. The Maude-NPA strategy for generating languages
involves three stages.
Term Generation. In this stage, the Maude-NPA takes each term deﬁned by a
language production and ﬁnds, by backwards narrowing, a complete set S of
paths to the state in which the intruder knows that term, where by “complete”
we mean that any path from an initial state to that term must contain a path
from S as a subpath. For example, with respect to seed terms sd1 and sd2, we
have the following backwards narrowing steps 10 , where we indicate the strand
involved in such step, variables M1,M
′
1,M2,M
′
2 are of sort Msg, and variables
X,Y,Z are of sort Elm:
(M1;M2)id,s4 M1,M2 (M1;M2)[M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 X, (Y ;Z)
(M1;M2)id,s5 M
′
1; (M1;M2) (M1;M2)id,s5 (M1;M2);M
′
2
(M1;M2)id,s7 pk(i, (M1;M2)) (M1;M2)id,s6 sk(A, (M1;M2))
Intuitively, the step (M1;M2) id,s4 M1,M2 implies that in order for the
intruder to learn message (M1;M2), he/she needs to have learned mes-
sages M1 and M2 in a previous state of the protocol. And the step
11
(M1;M2)[M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 X, (Y ;Z) implies that the intruder must learn mes-
sages X and (Y ;Z) in order to send message ((X;Y );Z) to a principal.
Rule Veriﬁcation. In this stage, the Maude-NPA examines each path and de-
termines which paths are already captured by the grammars, i.e., which paths
already require the intruder to know a member of the language in order to produce
the goal. The tool removes those paths from consideration.
For example, with respect to seed term sd1 ≡ M1 /∈I 	→ (M1;M2)∈L and the
backwards narrowing step (M1;M2) id,s4 M1,M2, we have a contradiction,
since the intruder must learn message M1 but we have a constraint saying that
the intruder does not know M1 (i.e., M1 /∈I). We have a similar contradiction
for seed term sd2 ≡ M2 /∈I 	→ (M1;M2)∈L, the step (M1;M2) id,s4 M1,M2,
and the message M2. For the step (M1;M2) [M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 X, (Y ;Z), how-
ever, the term (Y ;Z) belongs to the language of the seed term sd2 and thus,
we remove it. That is, Z /∈I implies (Y ;Z)∈L by using the language production
M2 /∈I 	→ (M1;M2)∈L. For the remaining backwards narrowing steps, none is
captured by the formal languages associated to sd1 or sd2, respectively, and thus
none is dicarded.
10Again, for ease of reading, we deliberately omit the rewrite theory RSP = (ΣSP , RSP , ESP ) used in each
narrowing step RSP ,ESP during the grammar generation. The rewrite theory RSP is a simpliﬁcation of
the rewrite theory RP for the grammar generation stage and is automatically obtained from it; see [10] for
further details.
11One could expect the step (M1;M2) [M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 (X; Y ), Z instead of
(M1;M2) [M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 X, (Y ;Z). However, the E-uniﬁcation problem considered here
is (M1;M2) =E (M
′
1;M
′
2), which arises when trying to apply the rule (M
′
1;M
′
2) → M
′
1,M
′
2
(which is obtained from strand s4 and stored in RSP) to term (M1;M2). The computed E-
uniﬁer is [ M1/(X; Y ), M2/Z, M ′1/X, M
′
2/(Y ;Z) ], which is obtained by applying the rewrite rule
X; (Y ;Z) → (X; Y );Z (stored in
→
E) to the term (M ′1;M
′
2).
S. Escobar et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 23–3632
Intuitively, at this stage, messages X, (Y ;Z), (M ′1; (M1;M2)),
((M1;M2);M
′
2), pk(i, (M1;M2)), and sk(A, (M1;M2)) have not yet been
deﬁned to be a member of the language for sd1, so these paths stay in for the
next stage. Similarly, messages (M ′1; (M1;M2)), ((M1;M2);M
′
2), pk(i, (M1;M2)),
and sk(A, (M1;M2)) stay in for seed term sd2.
Rule Generation. In the rule generation stage, the Maude-NPA looks at the re-
maining paths, and generates a new set of grammar rules according to a set of
heuristics. We have four heuristics H1,H2a,H2b,H3 that are used according to
two global strategies S1 and S2.
(H1) This heuristic extends the language and, essentially, looks for terms that
could be captured by it but are not. For example, with respect to the
backwards narrowing step (M1;M2) id,s5 M
′
1; (M1;M2), we have that mes-
sage (M ′1; (M1;M2)) is learned by the intruder from message (M1;M2) and,
since (M1;M2) is already in the language for sd1 and is a proper subterm of
(M ′1; (M1;M2)), we add a grammar rule Y ∈L 	→ (M
′
1;Y )∈L that allows the
new grammar to capture message (M ′1; (M1;M2)). Similarly, we generate the
grammar rule Y ∈L 	→ (Y ;M ′2)∈L from the narrowing step (M1;M2) id,s5
(M1;M2);M
′
2, the grammar rule Y ∈L 	→ pk(i, Y )∈L from the narrowing step
(M1;M2) id,s7 pk(i, (M1;M2)), and the grammar rule Y ∈L 	→ sk(A,Y )∈L
from the narrowing step (M1;M2)id,s6 sk(A, (M1;M2)).
(H2a) This heuristic restricts the language. It detects that there is a constraint
u/∈I that has been instantiated by the computed E-uniﬁer. This implies that
the intruder might learn some partial data (symbols introduced by uniﬁcation)
and thus such partial data should be excluded from the language. For the
narrowing step (M1;M2) [M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 X, (Y ;Z), the constraint M1∈I
is instantiated and therefore we introduce the constraint M1(X;Y ), where
X,Y are variables of sort Elm.
(H2b) This heuristic detects also that some partial data might be learned by
the intruder and also excludes them from the language. For the narrow-
ing step (M1;M2) [M1/(X;Y ),M2/Z],s4 X, (Y ;Z), we introduce the constraint
(M1;M2)((X;Y );Z), where X,Y,Z are variables of sort Elm. The use of H2a
and H2b is explained below.
(H3) This heuristic extends the current grammar G but using constraints
u/∈I. For example, with respect to the step (M1;M2) id,s7 pk(i, (M1;M2))
and the seed term sd1, we have the constraint M1 /∈I. Since M1
is unknown by the intruder and is a proper subterm of the message
pk(i, (M1;M2)), then pk(i, (M1;M2)) must be unknown by the intruder. There-
fore, we would add a grammar rule Y /∈I 	→ pk(i, (Y ;M2))∈L; note that we do
not really include such language production in the ﬁnal grammar, since the
application of heuristic H1 precludes heuristic H3.
These heuristics are applied following one of the following global strategies S1 or
S2. Apply heuristics in the following order for strategy S1: try H1, if it fails try
H2a, if it fails try H3, otherwise stop with failure the whole grammar generation
process for this grammar. Strategy S2 is similar to S1, but tries H2b instead of
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H2a. The diﬀerence between strategies S2 and S1 (i.e., between heuristics H2b
and H2a) is that S2 generates more restricted grammars, thus cutting less terms
and providing bigger formal languages, than strategy S1. However, strategy S1
can be applied in fewer situations than strategy S2, because of the /∈I constraint
for heuristic H2a. Therefore, for a seed term of the form ∅ 	→ t∈L only strategy
S2 can be applied, whereas for a seed term of the form t|q /∈I 	→ t∈L it is usually
better to start with strategy S2 and if it fails, then try strategy S1.
After the rule generation stage, the Maude-NPA reiterates the three stages until
either all paths are eliminated in the rule veriﬁcation stage, in which case it has
successfully deﬁned a language, or it can deﬁne no new language rules in the rule
generation stage, in which case it has failed to deﬁne a language. It can also conceiv-
ably fail to terminate adding new rules forever. See [10] for examples of grammars
that fail to deﬁne a language or fail to terminate.
The tool generates the following grammars G!sd1 , G
!
sd2
, G!sd3 , and G
!
sd4
, respec-
tively, using strategy S1:
(g1.1) M∈L → pk(i,M)∈L
(g1.2) M∈L → sk(A,M)∈L
(g1.3) M2∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g1.4) M1∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g1.5) M1 /∈I, M1n(a, r),
M1(b;n(a, r′)) → M1;M2∈L
(g2.1) M∈L → pk(i,M)∈L
(g2.2) M∈L → sk(A,M)∈L
(g2.3) M2∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g2.4) M1∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g2.5) M2 /∈I, M2n(a, r),
M2(n(a, r′); s) → M1;M2∈L
(g3.1) M∈L → pk(i,M)∈L
(g3.2) M∈L → sk(A,M)∈L
(g3.3) M2∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g3.4) M1∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g3.5) M /∈I, M((b; n(a, r)); s),
M(N ; s) → sk(A,M)∈L
(g4.1) M∈L → pk(i,M)∈L
(g4.2) M∈L → sk(A,M)∈L
(g4.3) M2∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g4.4) M1∈L → M1;M2∈L
(g4.5) M /∈I → pk(A,M)∈L
For instance, grammar rule g3.5 says that a message sk(A,M) is in the language
of the grammar for seed term sd3, if the subterm M is not known by the intruder
at the current state of the protocol run (i.e., the fact M /∈I appears in the intruder
knowledge of such state), and the message M is not of the form (b; (n(a, r)); s nor
N ; s. Note that in this case (and many others) the grammars reduce the inﬁnite
search space to a ﬁnite one. For instance, capturing the following inﬁnite backwards
narrowing sequence
sk(a, (b;N); s) (M1; sk(a, (b;N); s))  (M
′
1;M1; sk(a, (b;N); s))  · · ·
since expression (M1; sk(a, (b;N); s)) belongs to the language for seed term sd2.
That is, (M1; sk(a, (b;N); s)) is captured by grammar production g2.5, since the
fact sk(a, (b;N); s)/∈I is introduced into the intruder knowledge after the backwards
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narrowing step sk(a, (b;M); s) (M1; sk(a, (b;M); s)).
3.3 Backwards Reachability Analysis
The ﬁnal state attack pattern to be given as input to the system is:
[ sk(a,M ; s)−, sk(a, (b;N); s))− | nil ] & { K }
where the strand is at its ﬁnal position (i.e., every message is in the past), M is a
variable of sort Msg, N is a variable of sort Nonce, and K is a variable representing
the intruder knowledge. Note that M , being of sort Msg instead of sort Nonce, is the
key fact for the confusion attack, see Footnote 5. The intruder knowledge is essential
in the backwards reachability process and thus variable K will be appropriately
instantiated; see [10] for details. Our tool is able to ﬁnd the following initial state
of the protocol:
[ nil | n(s, r)+ ] & [ nil | n(s, r′)+ ] &
[ nil | n(s, r)−, (sk(a, n(s, r); s))+, (sk(a, b; (n(a, r′′); s)))+ ] &
[ nil | n(s, r′)−, (sk(a, n(s, r′); s))+, (sk(a, b; (n(a, r′′′); s)))+ ] &
[ nil | (sk(a, (b;n(a, r′′)); s))−, (sk(a, (b;n(a, r′′′)); s))− ] &
{ n(s, r)/∈I, n(s, r′)/∈I, sk(a, (b;n(a, r′′)); s)/∈I, sk(a, (b;n(a, r′′′)); s)/∈I }
where r, r′, r′′, r′′′ are variables of sort Fresh, all the strands are in their initial
position (i.e., every message is in the future), and the intruder does not know but
it will learn four messages exchanged in the protocol run. Note that the messages
sk(a, n(s, r); s) and sk(a, n(s, r′); s) are of no interest to the intruder. The concrete
message exchange sequence is:
n(s, r′)+ . n(s, r′)− . sk(a, n(s, r′); s)+ . sk(a, b; (n(a, r′′′); s))+ . n(s, r)+ .
n(s, r)− . sk(a, n(s, r); s)+ . sk(a, b; (n(a, r′′); s))+ . sk(a, (b;n(a, r′′)); s)− .
sk(a, (b;n(a, r′′′)); s)−
4 Conclusions
We have presented a high-level overview of the rewriting-based formalization of the
NPA reachability analysis and language generation mechanisms that we call the
Maude-NPA. And we have illustrated its use, in contexts beyond the Dolev-Yao
perfect cryptography or bounded number of sessions assumptions, by means of a
protocol with an attack that can only be found by taking into account equational
properties of the underlying cryptographic infrastructure: in our example the as-
sociativity of the message concatenation operator. The Maude-NPA prototype has
been used for this example, both to produce the grammars and to ﬁnd the attack.
As pointed out in the Introduction, this work is a ﬁrst step within a longer-term
research project to use NPA-like mechanisms in the analysis of protocols in which
attacks may make use of the algebraic properties of underlying cryptographic func-
tions. For example, we are working on extending the Maude-NPA with narrowing
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capabilities modulo equational theories for which ﬁnitary uniﬁcation algorithms ex-
ist, such as, for example, associativity-commutativity, the Boolean theory, and some
forms of modular exponentiation [18,14].
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